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Abstract
Motivated by a problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with weak preferences over time-
slots, the random assignment problem (also called the house allocation problem) is considered
on a uniform preference domain. For the subdomain in which preferences are strict except
possibly for the class of unacceptable objects, Bogomolnaia and Moulin characterized the
probabilistic serial mechanism as the only mechanism satisfying equal treatment of equals,
strategyproofness, and ordinal efficiency. The main result in this paper is that the natural
extension of the probabilistic serial mechanism to the domain of weak, but uniform, prefer-
ences fails strategyproofness, but so does every other mechanism that is ordinally efficient
and treats equals equally. If envy-free assignments are required, then any (probabilistic or
deterministic) mechanism that guarantees an ex post efficient outcome must fail even a weak
form of strategyproofness.
1 Introduction
We study the assignment problem, which is concerned with allocating a set of objects to a set
of agents, each of whom wishes to receive at most one object. Agents have preferences over
the objects, and the goal is to allocate the objects to the agents in a fair and efficient manner.
Further, as each agent’s preference ordering over the objects is private information, we require
the mechanism to be strategyproof: it should be a dominant strategy for the agents to report
their preference ordering truthfully. If the objects are divisible, we can think of a fractional
assignment in which an object may be allocated in varying amounts to multiple agents so that
the total amount allocated of any object is at most 1, and so that each agent receives at most
one unit in all. If the objects are indivisible, one can think of a lottery over assignments, which
again results in a fractional assignment matrix in which entry (i, a) represents the probability
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that agent i receives object a. These two views are equivalent for our purposes; while in the
rest of the paper we assume that the objects are indivisible, all of our results extend to the case
of divisible objects. There is now a rich literature on such models with applications to many
real-life allocation problems including allocating students to schools in various cities, the design
of kidney exchanges, etc [1, 2, 9, 22]. The two prominent mechanisms that have emerged from this
literature are the Random Priority (RP) mechanism and the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism.
The PS mechanism is stronger in terms of its efficiency and equity properties, but it is only weakly
strategyproof in the strict preference domain and not strategyproof in the full preference domain;
whereas the RP mechanism is strategyproof, but satisfies only a weaker version of efficiency and
envy-freeness. Furthermore, Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] show that no strategyproof mechanism
can satisfy the stronger form of efficiency and equity that the PS mechanism satisfies.
This paper is inspired by the paper of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] that characterized the PS
mechanism on a restricted preference domain. The PS mechanism was introduced in an earlier
paper of Cres and Moulin [11] that was motivated by the problem of scheduling unit-length jobs
with deadlines. Suppose there are n jobs, each requiring a unit processing time, and all jobs are
available at time zero. As the jobs all have unit-length, one could think of the scheduling problem
as one of assigning time-slots 1, 2, . . . , n to the jobs, so that slot k represents the interval (k−1, k],
and a job assigned to slot k finishes at time k. Jobs have deadlines and earn a non-negative utility
if they complete before their deadline. Specifically, if the deadline of job j is dj , then the utility
of assigning j to slot k is monotonically decreasing in k until the deadline, after which it drops
to zero. That is, if uj,k denotes the utility of assigning job j to slot k, then
uj,1 > uj,2 . . . > uj,dj > 0 = uj,dj+1 = uj,dj+2, . . . , uj,n.
The goal is to use a nonpricing mechanism to schedule the jobs in a fair and efficient manner
based on their reported utility information. Cres and Moulin [11] proposed the PS mechanism
and showed that it finds an ordinally efficient and envy-free allocation (all definitions appear in the
next section); furthermore, they showed that the PS mechanism is strategyproof on this domain:
note that each job/agent need only report their deadline, and they show that it is a weakly
dominant strategy for each job to report its deadline truthfully. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8]
characterize the PS mechanism on this restricted domain in two different ways: first, they show
that ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness characterize the PS outcome on this restricted domain;
and second, they show that it is the only strategyproof mechanism that is ordinally efficient and
treats equals equally. Taken together, their result shows that the PS mechanism is perhaps the
only compelling mechanism on this restricted preference domain1.
1Cres and Moulin [11] show that the PS mechanism is in fact group strategyproof, although this stronger property
is not needed in the characterization results of PS.
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In this paper we consider a slightly more general domain, again inspired by the problem of
scheduling unit-length jobs. For simplicity, assume there are n agents and n objects, and suppose
the objects are arranged in the order (1, 2, . . . , n) by all the agents. Each agent’s preference
ranking, however, is determined by a weakly decreasing utility function over the objects, in contrast
to a strictly decreasing utility function over the objects till a deadline. (A good way to visualize
this preference domain is to have each agent separate the sequence of objects into indifference
classes, without disturbing the common order on the objects.) This domain is quite natural in
the scheduling context, where completing a job early is always (weakly) better, but jobs may be
insensitive to completion times within a certain time interval, and these intervals may change
from job to job. The domain considered in the earlier papers is a special case in which, for each
agent, all but the final indifference class has a single object. It is then natural to ask if the two
characterizations of PS extend to this domain. It turns out that the answer is negative for both
characterizations. We show that the PS outcome (actually, a correspondence) is no longer the
only outcome that is ordinally efficient and envy-free, nor is the PS mechanism strategyproof on
this domain. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that:
• No weakly strategyproof mechanism can satisfy both ex post efficiency and envy freeness
on this domain, when there are three or more agents; and
• No strategyproof mechanism can satisfy both ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of equals
on this domain, when there are four or more agents.
The literature on random assignment problems focuses on simultaneously satisfying various
notions of fairness, efficiency, and strategyproofness, and several impossibility results have been
established over the last two decades [4, 7, 10, 15, 16, 25]. Our two main impossibility results
are strengthened versions of similar results in the literature in which preferences are drawn from
richer domains. Specifically, versions of the two impossibility results have been obtained by Katta
and Sethuraman [16] on the full preference domain (where any weak ordering of the objects is
permissible), and by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [7] on the strict preference domain (where any
strict ordering of the objects is permissible). Thus the surprising element in our result is that
these difficulties persist even in domains in which the preferences are severely restricted.
Our work contributes to the rich and growing literature on matching and allocation problems
in which monetary transfers are not permitted. The PS mechanism and the Random Priority
mechanims are central mechanisms for such allocation problems and have been studied extensively
from several points of view, see the recent survey of Sonmez and Unver [23] for an overview. This
has also inspired other characterizations and extensions of the PS mechanism [3, 4, 6, 13, 17, 18].
There is an equally extensive literature on models where monetary transfers are allowed to restore
fairness or strategyproofness in a queueing or scheduling setting [12, 19, 20, 21, 24], and we refer
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the reader to the work of Hassin and Haviv [14] for a comprehensive overview.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model and Definitions
An assignment problem is given by a triple (N,O,%), where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of agents,
O = {o1, . . . on} is the set of objects, and the preference profile %= (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies each
agent’s preference ordering over the objects. We will assume that the preference relation of each
agent is complete (every pair of objects is comparable) and transitive. By a %i b, we mean that
agent i weakly prefers object a to object b. We write a ≻i b if i strictly prefers a to b, i.e. a %i b
but b 6%i a; and we use a ∼i b when i is indifferent between a and b, i.e. a %i b and b %i a.
We assume that the indifference relation is also transitive. Thus each agent has a most-preferred
subset of objects (and the agent is indifferent between all the objects within this set), followed by
a most-preferred subset of objects among the remaining ones, etc.
In this paper, we shall consider the uniform preference domain in which o1 %i o2 %i . . . %i on
for every agent i ∈ N . Agents differ in their preference ordering only in their strict preference
relation ≻i (and hence their indifference relation ∼i). In the rest of the paper, we use the following
notation for the preference ordering of the agents: all the objects within an indifference class for
an agent appear within braces in that agent’s preference list, and these maximal indifference
classes are separated by a comma; objects are always written in subscript order; and the braces
are omitted for singleton indifference classes. Thus, the preference ordering
o1 ≻i o2 ∼i o3 ∼i o4 ≻i o5
for agent i is written as
i : o1, {o2 o3 o4}, o5.
By a mechanism, we mean a mapping from the set of all preference profiles (within this re-
stricted domain) to a doubly stochastic matrix2, which we call the assignment matrix for that
profile. The assignment matrix is deterministic if its entries are {0, 1} (and so the outcome is a
matching of the agents and objects); otherwise, it is probabilistic. If a mechanism maps each pref-
erence profile to a deterministic matrix, the mechanism is deterministic; otherwise the mechanism
is probabilistic3. As a consequence of the Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem [5], the outcome of a
2If the number of agents is not the same as the number of objects, the outcome is typically a matrix in which
the row-sums and the column-sums are each at most 1. One can always balance such a problem by adding dummy
agents or dummy objects.
3Alternatively, we could have defined a probabilistic mechanism as a lottery over deterministic mechanisms. In
this view, different lotteries are regarded as different mechanisms, even if they result in the same assignment matrix
for each preference profile.
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probabilistic mechanism can be implemented as a lottery over deterministic assignments.
Given two probabilistic assignments P and Q, we say that agent i prefers P to Q if Pi
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stochastically dominates Qi according to i’s preferences. Formally,
Pi %i Qi ⇐⇒
∑
k:k%ij
pik ≥
∑
k:k%ij
qik, ∀j ∈ O.
We say that i strictly prefers P to Q, denoted by Pi ≻i Qi, if at least one of the inequalities in
the above definition is strict. Note that this definition is only a partial order, as an agent may not
be able to compare two probabilistic allocations. Finally, we say that P stochastically dominates
Q, denoted by P % Q, if Pi %i Qi for all i ∈ N , with Pi ≻i Qi for some i ∈ N . Again, this notion
of stochastic dominance defines a partial order on the set of doubly stochastic matrices.
2.2 Desirable Properties
We define some desirable properties of mechanisms that play an important role in the rest of the
paper.
Ordinal Efficiency. An assignment matrix P is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically
dominated by any other random assignment matrix Q such that Q % P . It is well known that
any ordinally efficient matrix can be implemented as a lottery over deterministic Pareto efficient
assignments. Furthermore, checking whether or not a given assignment matrix is ordinally efficient
is computationally easy [7, 16].
Ex post Efficiency A weaker notion of efficiency that we will consider is ex post efficiency,
which is satisfied by the random priority mechanism. A bi-stochastic matrix P is ex post efficient
if it can be written as a convex combination of Pareto efficient assignments.
Envy-Freeness. An assignment matrix P is envy free if the probabilistic assignment of every
agent i stochastically dominates the probabilistic assignment of every other agent with respect to
agent i’s preference ordering. Let Pi denote the probabilistic assignment of agent i in the matrix
P . Then, P is envy-free if Pi %i Pi′ for all i, i
′ ∈ N .
Equal Treatment of Equals. An assignment matrix P satisfies equal treatment of equals if
agents with identical preferences get equivalent allocations. Formally, P satisfies equal treatment
of equals if for all i, i′ ∈ N such that %i=%i′=%, we have
∑
k:k%j
pik =
∑
k:k%j
pi′k, ∀j ∈ O.
4
Pi denotes the i-th row of P
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Strategyproofness. The properties defined so far pertain to the outcome on a single profile;
strategyproofness, however, is a property of the mechanism, in particular, on how the mechanism
behaves on pairs of profiles in which all but one of the agents report the same preference ordering.
A mechanism is strategyproof if it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to report their
true preference ordering. Formally, a mechanism is strategyproof if
Pi(%i,%−i) %i Pi(%
′
i,%−i),
for all agents i ∈ N , and for all preference profiles %−i of the other agents, and for every pair of
preferences %i,%
′
i that i could report. A random assignment mechanism is weakly strategyproof
if for each i ∈ N , and for each preference profile %−i of the other agents, there does not exist
preference ordering %′i such that Pi(%
′
i,%−i) ≻i Pi(%i,%−i). In a strategyproof mechanism,
the assignment under truthful reporting stochastically dominates the assignment under any other
report; in a weakly strategyproof mechanism, however, reporting her preference ordering truthfully
will not result in an assignment that is stochastically dominated by the assignment under any
other report. It is clear from the definitions that strategyproofness implies weak strategyproofness,
but not vice-versa.
2.3 The Extended Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
We end this section with a very brief description of the EPS mechanism [16]. The EPS mechanism,
like the PS mechanism, can be described as a “cake-eating” mechanism in which agents consume
their best object(s) at unit rate. Roughly, each agent simultaneously consumes her “best set”
of available objects at a unit rate at each point in time. If all the preferences are strict, this
determines a unique allocation for the agents; when agents have indifferences, this mechanism
is not well-defined as each agent has a choice on how her unit rate is apportioned across the
objects in her best set of objects. For instance, if agent i strictly prefers a to b, whereas agent
i′ is indifferent between a and b, letting both agents consume a initially will result in each agent
getting 1/2 of a and 1/2 of b, which is clearly inefficient in the ordinal sense; if i′ consumes b at rate
1, however, the outcome is ordinally efficient. Building on this intuition, Katta and Sethuraman
[16] proposed the EPS mechanism that:
1. Identifies a subset S⋆ of agents with the least collective claim over the union of their best
objects C(S⋆) (in terms of average claim per agent within the subset); (We will refer to S⋆
as the bottleneck set.)
2. Assigns each agent in S⋆ an amount of |C(S
⋆)|
|S⋆| of their favorite object(s);
3. Promises the rest of the agents an amount of at least |C(S
⋆)|
|S⋆| of their favorite object(s); and
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4. Removes the allocated objects, and recurses on the subproblem (agents in S⋆ now start
consuming their favorite objects(s) out of the remaining objects.)
The authors showed that the bottleneck sets can be identified by solving a sequence of parametric
max flow problems. We refer the reader to their paper for a complete description of the algorithm.
Note that in the full preference domain, an agent is insensitive to different probabilistic allo-
cations of objects within the same indifference class as long as the allocations sum up to the same
quantity for every indifference class. This motivates the following equivalence relation over the
set of assignment matrices. Given a preference profile %, let Ii be the collection of indifference
classes of objects for agent i. For every I ∈ Ii, let piI =
∑
oj∈I
pij. We say that two random
assignment matrices P and Q are equivalent if and only if
piI = qiI ∀i ∈ N, I ∈ Ii.
One can check that this defines an equivalence relation on the set of assignment matrices. An
assignment matrix is an EPS assignment if it is equivalent to the random assignment found by
the EPS mechanism5.
3 Main Results
Bogomolnaia and Moulin [8] showed that if the preference domain is further restricted so that the
acceptable set of objects for each agent i is the set {o1, o2 . . . , oki}, and if the agents have strict
(and uniform) preferences over their acceptable objects, then the PS outcome is characterized
by ordinal efficiency and envy-freeness, and that it is the only strategyproof mechanism that
guarantees ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of equals. We show that neither one of these
results holds when the agents have weak preferences.
3.1 Non-uniqueness of Ordinally Efficient and Envy Free Assignments
The EPS mechanism finds an equivalence class of ordinally efficient and envy free assignments
for each preference profile. However, there are other assignments with these properties. For the
preference profile
1: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
5Katta and Sethuraman [16] do not discuss how Steps 2 and 3 described earlier are implemented; each allocation
satisfying the conditions of Steps 2 and 3 may give a different assignment matrix but these are all equivalent.
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the following assignment
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 14 0
1
2
1
4
2: 14 0
1
2
1
4
3: 14
1
2 0
1
4
4: 14
1
2 0
1
4
is ordinally efficient and envy free. However, the EPS mechanism will not compute the above
assignment since agents 1 and 2 strictly prefers o1 to o2 whereas agents 3 and 4 are indifferent
between o1 and o2. Thus, in the EPS mechanism, agents 3 and 4 consume o2 first so as to not
compete with agents 1 and 2 for their unique best object. Consequently, EPS finds the following
assignment
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 12 0
1
4
1
4
2: 12 0
1
4
1
4
3: 0 12
1
4
1
4
4: 0 12
1
4
1
4
Clearly the two assignments do not belong to the same equivalence class: agents 1 and 2 strictly
prefer the latter, whereas agents 3 and 4 strictly prefer the former.
3.2 Impossibility Results
Theorem 1. For n ≥ 3, any mechanism that is both ex-post efficient and envy-free is not even
weakly strategyproof in the uniform preference domain.
Proof. We first show the impossibility result for n = 3. Consider Profile 1 (below). Clearly, the
set of envy-free (EF) assignments at this profile is as described for some 0 ≤ y ≤ 1/6.
Profile 1
1: o1, o2, o3
2: o1, {o2 o3}
3: o1, o2, o3
o1 o2 o3
1: 13
1
2 − y
1
6 + y
2: 13 2y
2
3 − 2y
3: 13
1
2 − y
1
6 + y
By the structure of the preferences in Profile 1, agent 2 cannot receive object o2 in any Pareto
efficient assignment, as there is always a Pareto improvement with the agent who is assigned o3.
Thus y = 0 in any ex-post efficient (EPE) assignment.
Similarly, in Profile 2 below, the set of envy-free assignments is as described for some 0 ≤ w ≤ 16
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and 0 ≤ z ≤ 112 .
Profile 2
1: o1, o2, o3
2: o1, {o2 o3}
3: {o1 o2}, o3
o1 o2 o3
1: 12 − w
1
4 + w − z
1
4 + z
2: 12 − w w + 2z
1
2 − 2z
3: 2w 34 − 2w − z
1
4 + z
Again, agent 2 cannot be assigned o2 in any Pareto efficient assignment, as there is always a
Pareto improvement with the agent assigned o3, so w = z = 0 in any ex-post efficient assignment.
Observe that the properties of ex-post efficiency and envy-freeness determine a unique assign-
ment in both Profile 1 and Profile 2. Furthermore, agents 1 and 2 have the same preferences in
both profiles, but agent 3’s allocation in Profile 1 stochastically dominates his allocation in Profile
2, implying a failure of weak strategyproofness.
For n ≥ 4, extend each of the profiles as follows: the first 3 agents have exactly the same
preference ordering over the first 3 objects; and they have strict preferences over the objects
o4, o5, . . . , on; finally, agent i (for i ≥ 4) is indifferent between the first i objects, after which he
has strict preferences over the others. That is, i’s preference ordering is
j : {o1 . . . oi}, oi+1, . . . , on.
It is straightforward to check that agent i receives object oi in every Pareto efficient assignment,
and so the first 3 agents must be allocated the first 3 objects, leading to the same two profiles
analyzed earlier.
As the EPS mechanism is ordinally efficient (and so ex-post efficient as well) and envy-free, an
immediate consequence is that the EPS mechanism is not weakly strategyproof on the uniform
domain. The Random Priority (RP) mechanism, adapted to the setting of indifferences, is both
strategyproof and ex-post efficient, and so fails envy-freeness. For the domain considered by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin, neither of these results hold, as the PS mechanism is strategyproof and
the RP mechanism is envy-free.
Next, we show that if we relax envy freeness to equal treatment of equals, but strengthen weak
strategyproofness and ex-post efficiency to strategyproofness and ordinal efficiency respectively,
a similar impossibility result holds for the uniform preference domain.
Theorem 2. For n ≥ 4, any mechanism that satisfies ordinal efficiency and equal treatment of
equals is not strategyproof in the uniform preference domain.
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Proof. We first show the result for n = 4. Consider the following 8 profiles
Profile 1
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: o1, o2, o3, o4
Profile 2
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
Profile 3
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
Profile 4
1: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
Profile 5
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: o1, o2, o3, o4
Profile 6
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
Profile 7
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
Profile 8
1: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
We shall show that in profile 8 there is no probabilistic assignment that simultaneously satisfies
ordinal efficiency (OE), equal treatment of equals (ETE), and strategyproofness (SP) in relation
to the first seven profiles.
First, we compute the probability assignment for profile 1. Notice that the only assignment
that satisfies ETE is
Profile 1
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: o1, o2, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 14
1
4
1
4
1
4
2: 14
1
4
1
4
1
4
3: 14
1
4
1
4
1
4
4: 14
1
4
1
4
1
4
Now we consider profile 2. Let pij be the probability that agent i is assigned the object oj. By
ordinal efficiency, p41 = 0. For otherwise p42 < 1, which means that one of p12, p22, p32 is strictly
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positive; this agent can exchange a small amount of o2 for an equal amount of o1 from agent 4,
without altering any of the other allocations to obtain a new allocation matrix that stochastically
dominates the current one, and this violates ordinal efficiency.
By strategyproofness, we must have that p41 + p42 =
1
2 , because if it were not the case, then
there is a profitable deviation of agent 4 either from profile 1 to profile 2 or vice versa. Thus, we
get that p42 =
1
2 since p41 = 0. Similarly, by strategyproofness, we have that p41 + p42 + p43 =
3
4 ,
which implies that p43 =
1
4 and p44 =
1
4 .
Finally by ETE, we know the probability assignment of the first three agents must be identical,
thus we get the following assignment:
Profile 2
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 13
1
6
1
4
1
4
2: 13
1
6
1
4
1
4
3: 13
1
6
1
4
1
4
4: 0 12
1
4
1
4
Now we consider profile 3. In profile 3, by SP in relation to profile 2, we must have that
p31 + p32 =
1
2 , p33 =
1
4 , and p34 =
1
4 . By ETE, the same assignment for agent 4 satisfy the
same constraints as that of agent 3. By OE, p31 = p41 = 0, because either p31 > 0 or p41 > 0
would imply that p32 + p42 < 1 (as p31 + p32 + p41 + p42 = 1) or equivalently that p12 + p22 > 0.
Then again we have a situation where agent 1 or 2 can exchange a small amount of o2 for an
equal amount of o1 from agent 3 or 4, which leads to a new assignment matrix that stochastically
dominates the current one, violating OE. Thus, OE and SP together determines the probabilistic
assignment for agents 3 and 4. Now, we can fill in the assignments for agents 1 and 2 via ETE to
get:
Profile 3
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 12 0
1
4
1
4
2: 12 0
1
4
1
4
3: 0 12
1
4
1
4
4: 0 12
1
4
1
4
Now we consider profile 4. By SP in relation with profile 3 and ETE, we must have that
p11 + p12 = p31 + p32 = p41 + p42 =
1
2 , p13 = p33 = p43 =
1
4 , and p14 = p34 = p44 =
1
4 . Since p12+
p32 + p42 ≤ 1, in order to satisfy the unit demand for agents 1, 3, and 4, we must have that at
least one of p11, p31, p41 is strictly positive. Thus by OE, we must have p22 = 0 and p21 =
1
2 .
Although we cannot pin down a single assignment for this profile, any feasible assignment must
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be of the form:
Profile 4
1: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
2: o1, o2, o3, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: x 12 − x
1
4
1
4
2: 12 0
1
4
1
4
3: y 12 − y
1
4
1
4
4: 12 − x− y x+ y
1
4
1
4
for some x, y ≥ 0 and x+ y ≤ 12 .
Now we consider profile 5. Applying the same argument of ordinal efficiency for agent 4 in
profile 2 to agent 2 in profile 5, we get that p22 = 0. By strategyproofness in relation to profile 1,
we must have that p21 =
1
4 and that p21+ p22+ p23 =
3
4 . Hence, we get that p23 =
1
2 and p24 =
1
4 .
Finally by ETE, we know the probability assignment of the agents 1, 2 and 4 must be identical,
thus we get the following assignment:
Profile 5
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: o1, o2, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 14
1
3
1
6
1
4
2: 14 0
1
2
1
4
3: 14
1
3
1
6
1
4
4: 14
1
3
1
6
1
4
Now we consider profile 6. By SP in relation with profile 2, we must have that p21 =
1
3 ,
p22 + p23 =
5
12 , and p24 =
1
4 . By OE, we must have that p22 = 0, which implies that p23 =
5
12 .
By SP in relation with profile 5, we must have that p41 + p42 =
7
12 , p43 =
1
6 , p44 =
1
4 . Again, by
OE, we must have that p41 = 0, which implies that p42 =
7
12 . Subsequently, we can fill in the
assignments for agents 1 and 3 via ETE to get:
Profile 6
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: o1, o2, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 13
5
24
5
24
1
4
2: 13 0
5
12
1
4
3: 13
5
24
5
24
1
4
4: 0 712
1
6
1
4
Now we consider profile 7. By SP in relation with profile 3, we must have that p21 =
1
2 ,
p22 + p23 =
1
4 , and p24 =
1
4 . By OE, we must have that p22 = 0, which implies that p23 =
1
4 . By
SP in relation with profile 6, we have that p31 + p32 =
13
24 , p33 =
5
24 and p34 =
1
4 . By ETE, agent
4 gets an equivalent assignment as agent 3. Notice that in this case, we must have that p31 > 0
and p41 > 0 as p32 + p42 ≤ 1 and p31 + p32 + p41 + p42 =
13
12 > 1, so either p31 or p41 is strictly
positive. This implies that p12 = p22 = 0 in order to satisfy OE. Thus, we get an assignment of
12
the following form:
Profile 7
1: o1, o2, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: 512 0
1
3
1
4
2: 12 0
1
4
1
4
3: z 1324 − z
5
24
1
4
4: 112 − z
11
24 + z
5
24
1
4
Finally, we consider profile 8. By SP in relation with profile 4, we must have that p21 =
1
2 ,
p22 + p23 =
1
4 , p24 =
1
4 . By OE, we must have that p22 = 0, which implies that p23 =
1
4 . By SP
in relation with profile 7 and ETE, we must have that p11 + p12 = p31 + x32 = x41 + x42 =
5
12 ,
p13 = p33 = p43 =
1
3 , p14 = p34 = p44 =
1
4 . Now consider the partially filled assignment below
Profile 8
1: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
2: o1, {o2 o3}, o4
3: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
4: {o1 o2}, o3, o4
o1 o2 o3 o4
1: ? ? 13
1
4
2: 12 0
1
4
1
4
3: ? ? 13
1
4
4: ? ? 13
1
4
Notice that this assignment violates the fact that p13 + p23 + p33 + p43 = 1. Since we used the
necessary conditions induced by SP, OE, ETE to pin down all possible assignments for each of
the profiles 1-7, and all of possible combinations of the first 7 profiles lead to this contradiction,
it is impossible to write down a random assignment in profile 8 that simultaneously satisfy ETE,
OE, and SP in relation to the other 7 profiles.
The following graph indicates how the profiles are linked via strategyproofness. (Profile i is
denoted Pi.)
For general n ≥ 5, we extend each of the 8 profiles as follows: agents 1 through 4 have the
same preference for objects o1 through o4; moreover, these agents have strict preference for the
rest of the objects. For every j = 5, . . . , n, agent j is indifference amongst objects o1 through oj
and has strict preference for the rest of the objects. Similar to the argument made for general
n in theorem 1, we see that by OE, every agent j = 5, . . . , n receives object oj with probability
1. Consequently, the first 4 agents must be allocated the first 4 objects, leading to the same 8
profiles analyzed earlier.
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